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I n this essay I am taking a stance as an outsider looking into the world of consumer research. Although I belong to the Association for Consumer Research, follow the field, and focus my research on consumption issues, my training is in anthropology, I have always worked and taught in anthropology departments, and most of my social and intellectual connections remain within anthropology. I think this gives me a perspective on the issue of restudies that may be different from that of most readers of JCR, and a comparison with the way anthropology has handled similar issues may be instructive.
THE ROLE OF RE-INQUIRY IN ANOTHER DISCIPLINE
Thanks to the renowned work of Clifford Geertz, many people associate the entire discipline of anthropology with ethnography and qualitative methods and with the idea of research as a process of interpretation and thick description rather than hypothesis formation and testing to produce general theoretical statements about the world. Yet, within anthropology, there is much more diversity of opinion. Geertz's interpretive approach is only one of many, and while popular, it is hardly dominant. Many anthropologists are quite comfortable with a basic positivistic approach and are more comfortable dealing with objects, measurements, and variables than with texts, symbols, or performances. Anthropologists in the same department are likely to disagree on their intellectual goals, standards, and basic epistemology. Some deny the possibility of objectivity and truth, while others see only the interaction of genes and evolutionary forces.
Many anthropologists thrive on controversy and intellectual warfare and seek to drive others from the field. Stanford University's anthropology program is only the most recent anthropology program to split into separate scientific and humanistic departments, forcing its staff members to choose sides. The same issues have divided anthropologists throughout much of the twentieth century in several guises. Some of the most contentious and polarizing moments of battle have been started by restudies.
In one well-known example, two famous anthropologists studied the same Mexican village and came to different conclusions. Robert Redfield worked there from 1926 to 1927 and published Tepoztlan: A Mexican Village in 1930 to great acclaim. He stressed the harmony of the village, the equality he found there, and the stability of people's lives, guided by long tradition that shielded them from the outside world. Oscar Lewis returned to Tepoztlan in 1943, and his Life in a Mexican Village: Tepoztlan Restudied appeared in 1951. He found the village divided, factionalized, and riven with conflict and violence. In this book, local people are depicted as suspicious, individualistic, uncooperative, jealous, and hostile to each other. Instead of equality, he found great differences between rich and poor, and he felt the divisions in the community were becoming greater as the economy changed.
Anthropologists reading the two studies could hardly believe they were about the same village. Both Redfield and Lewis denied that the village had changed substantially between 1927 and 1941, and the two were critical of each other's methods and interpretations. For some anthropologists, the differences between the accounts signaled that ethnography needed more explicit standards and objective measurements if it was to become a truly scientific enterprise. Others saw the subjectivity of the two accounts as a strength; an ethnography should be a unique product of an encounter between a particular person and a culture in a unique time and place, and comparison is not the point. These were two different ethnographers with different interests and theories, so we would expect two very different accounts.
It is possible to articulate a middle ground. Redfield and Lewis do actually agree on many descriptive details, and there is no question that a reader knows much more about Tepoztlan from reading both books than from reading either one alone. One can also learn about the differences between the two ethnographers, the historical development of theory and method in the discipline, and the changing role of the ethnographer in relation to national governments. From the point of view of extremists, a difference of opinion is the result of one party's error in data, interpretation, or theory, and it must lead to the rejection of one opinion or the other. From the middle ground, diversity and difference lead to accounts rich in nuance and interpretation, including elements that are objective and comparable as well as those that are contextual and subjective. Between the extremes, it is possible to see how separating objectivity from subjectivity impoverishes both.
After the Redfield-Lewis debates about objectivity, throughout the 1960s and 1970s, peace in anthropology took the form of borders and boundaries. Topics and issues like ecology, economics, evolution, and prehistory were seen as inherently suited to a scientific, quantitative approach. Religion, art, symbolism, and mythology were claimed by those doing qualitative and interpretive work. This peace was shattered by another restudy, this one done by a selfproclaimed positivist, attacking the veracity, methodology, and conclusions of one of the iconic figures of interpretive anthropology, Margaret Mead. Derek Freeman's book reconsidering Mead's work in Samoa conducted in the 1920s appeared in 1983, six years after Mead had died, so Mead was not able to defend herself.
It is hard to overstate the furor that Freeman's book caused (see Glick 1983) . Freeman claimed to have revisited the areas that Mead studied in her research for Coming of Age in Samoa (1928) , to have consulted contemporary documents, and even to have reinterviewed her surviving informants. He concluded that Mead was willingly deceived by her informants; her argument that Samoan adolescent girls were relaxed about sexuality and virginity was wrong. Worse, said Freeman, she manipulated the facts because she wanted to make a political and social argument against restrictive patriarchy in the modern West. Here we have the precursor to today's science wars, as postmodernists are accused of playing fast and loose with the facts in order to be politically correct. The counterarguments are that the selfproclaimed scientific positivists are hiding their own political beliefs and programs behind a spurious objectivity, that facts never speak for themselves outside of political and social context, and that science is itself a Western social construct. These (and many other charges) were all leveled at Freeman by Mead's defenders (Holmes 1987) .
Is anthropology a stronger discipline because of these and other more recent controversies occasioned by restudies? In each case, it has proven extremely difficult to untangle the reasons why restudies often reach very different conclusions. Is it because the Samoans changed so much, or did they tell different stories to Mead and Freeman? Or were differences in Mead's and Freeman's methods, philosophies, political agendas, or theoretical tools responsible? Outside the laboratory, any restudy of human culture and behavior has to confront all of these problems.
The uncertainty that has resulted from restudies has tended to divide anthropologists as well. At one extreme is a move to make anthropology more objective and scientific by sticking to aspects of culture that can be counted, measured, recorded, and tested, and by improving data gathering and management (Bernard et al. 1986; Moran 1995) . At the other extreme, some anthropologists want to abandon the scientific quest for objective truth and accept multiple subjective and situational explanations, using methods from arts and literature to express truths that cannot be found in numbers or data (Richardson 1990; Rosaldo 1989) . They not only argue for the universality of the "Rashomon effect" (where each observer sees something different), but they also revel in it.
Given this history of acrimony and divisive debate growing from restudies, can we imagine ways that restudies can instead contribute to integration and productive cooperation among scholars with different assumptions, methods, and goals? I want to argue that there is, indeed, a middle ground where both scientific and interpretive approaches make important contributions, and I will suggest some ways that restudies could further the project of building such a middle ground instead of creating divisions. First, however, I want to address both extremes with some counterarguments that undercut their absolutist stances against restudies. The arguments take the form of a classical logical paradox, which I will present in exaggerated and simplified terms.
RE-INQUIRIES ARE IMPOSSIBLE
In a laboratory setting it might be possible to truly replicate experimental results, although recent studies of laboratory research demonstrate that experimental replication plays a very small role in the real social and intellectual work of the laboratory (Latour 1987) . But the degree of control achieved in a chemistry laboratory can never be achieved with human subjects for practical and ethical reasons. Furthermore, the political, cultural, and personal agendas of researchers are always different. So, even if there were perfect laboratory control of human subjects, each investigator would view the subjects from a different point of view.
If pure replicability can never be achieved, each inquiry is actually a unique enterprise, conducted anew in changed circumstances with subjects who are never the same as those in previous studies, even if they are the same subjects. To a large extent, this is because of the uniquely intersubjective nature of human beings, which breaks down the absolute separation between researcher and subject and makes these people into partners, collaborators, and antagonists who constantly anticipate each others' goals and behaviors.
The context in which research takes place also makes a true re-inquiry impossible. Despite their best efforts, each researcher brings a unique set of abilities and motivations to her/his work that affects the way s/he defines the world. Science is itself a culturally mediated and socially contextualized enterprise; systematic observer bias is the rule rather than the exception. The goals and presuppositions of researchers will subtly bias their data and interpretations in ways beyond their control. Quantitative methodologies and analyses offer only spurious solutions to these problems by creating the illusion of comparability, while the significance and meaning of the numbers is constantly shifting. From this perspective, a special section in JCR for re-studies is futile.
ALL STUDIES ARE RE-INQUIRIES
All studies and research are essentially comparative and cumulative; one can say the same for laboratory science and literary criticism. Each piece of work exists in relationships to others that have come before. The normal practice in every academic discipline is for researchers to study people, places, and phenomena that have already been studied. In most fields, it is all but impossible to find a research topic that is truly novel. Instead, the rule is to apply new methodologies or analytical techniques to data that have already been collected and published, to extend previous analysis, and to critically assess previous work in the light of new data.
Even radical phenomenologists admit that intersubjective understanding-understanding based on an inherent ability to compare one's experience with that of others-is fundamental to all human social interaction (Jackson 1989) . Knowledge of any sort is, therefore, fundamentally built on comparison; science only formalizes this process. Any attempt to create new knowledge, insight, or emotion must, therefore, be constructed on preexisting work, and this is just as true for interpretive work as it is for laboratory science. This connection among projects ensures that each new piece of work is actually a restudy; novelty itself is only created in relationship to existing work.
What would a truly original piece of research look like? I suspect it would be unfundable and unpublishable. In practice, new work is justified by novelty along very narrow and carefully delimited pathways, so the setting, theory, and analytical tools are the same, but there will be a new methodology. Or the target group is new, and everything else is the same. Since all studies are, therefore, in a very direct sense restudies, why have a special section of JCR for them?
A RESOLUTION IN THE MILITANT MIDDLE GROUND
Although they take opposite stances, extremists on both sides reach the conclusion that there is no need to bracket particular papers as restudies and put them in a special section of this journal. Rather than abandoning the field to the extremists, I think there are very good reasons to stake out a middle ground from which to fight off what I have called theoretical fundamentalism (Wilk 1999) .
With this term I do not intend to make light of the very real ontological and epistemological differences that divide positivism from humanism (nomothetic from ideographic) in the social sciences and humanities today. There really are important issues at stake, but I argue that they are not issues that can be solved through research itself, since they rest ultimately on presuppositions and unquestioned assumptions about human nature (Wilk 1996) . I would argue further that the common linkage among particular research methodologies (quantitative and qualitative) with philosophical extremes is completely unnecessary. There is no particular reason why a positivist or a humanist cannot use any of the whole range of methodologies available in a way completely consonant with their own goals and assumptions. So-called qualitative information may easily be verified and reduced to numerical form in the most positivist way. Survey data and demographic clusters can equally be deconstructed and read thickly as a product of particular forms of administrative gaze that constitute a regime of discursive power.
The bifurcation between interpretive and nomothetic work in consumer research is particularly difficult to understand for an outsider, given that the range of variation in underlying epistemologies within the field as a whole seems rather narrow. To an anthropologist used to writing that constantly questions the nature of truth, the consumer researchers, who are most interested in qualitative ethnography, hermeneutics, and postmodern experimentation, are still concerned with standards of evidence and data quality, empirical generalization, and constructing general theory. Work such as that by Eric Arnould and Linda Price (1993), Douglas Holt (1998) , and Craig Thompson, Howard Pollio, and William Locander (1994) uses creative methodology, searches for depth over breadth, and seeks broad and more diverse source of theory, but it remains fundamentally objectivist and realist. In contrast, some quantitative psychometric consumer research appears more on the extreme of nomothetic positivism.
As an alternative to this binary way of viewing social science, I suggest a tolerant pluralism that claims a middle ground where many methods and philosophies have legitimacy and utility. A pluralist position in the middle requires militant defense against competing fundamentalisms and divisive rhetoric that depict certain forms of research practice as illegitimate, naive, politically tainted, or outmoded. I think this is the position where most practicing scholars work anyway, since most are more concerned with what works to solve problems than with defending a particular philosophical or theoretical position. What does pluralism look like in practice? Psychologist Robert Aunger (1995) suggests that different sorts of inquiry should be used sequentially or cyclically in the same research project, in order to draw on the strengths of each. Open-ended ideographic work produces unexpected insights, depth, and texture in individual cases, while, he says, formal and objective work makes full use of comparative cases and is capable of aggregation and generalization. In my own research on consumer culture in the country of Belize, I have found it useful to alternate stretches of questionnaire and survey research with periods of open-ended interviews, participant observation, and archival research.
Different modes of presentation can also be fruitfully combined, once the research itself is done. Margery Wolf's book A Thrice Told Tale (1992) uses multiple perspectives simultaneously. She depicts an incident concerning witchcraft in a Taiwanese village, first, as a short story, then, through a narrative based on raw fieldwork notes and data, and finally through an analytic study based on comparison with other cases and accounts, considering the broader implications of the incident for theories of witchcraft. One of her points in this exercise is to show that multiple methods and approaches are not mutually exclusive and that each has its own strengths and weaknesses. Together, their sum is greater than the total of the parts. Using multiple points of view in this way does not exclude the goal of seeking a unitary truth; it is possible to see the different methods as additive, leading to some kind of triangulation or convergence on the "right" answer. But pluralism does not presume such a unitary truth either, and the possibility that two studies or methods cannot be brought to bear on each other to eliminate alternative hypotheses, or that no single explanation is sufficient, must always be open.
RE-INQUIRY RE-EXAMINED
What perspective does a middle ground offer on the concept of re-inquiry? As David Mick argues in his JCR editorial to start this section (see the June 2001 issue), there is no reason why a restudy has to be cast in the strictly nomothetic mold of laboratory scientists replicating an experiment to verify the results and build general theory. But there is no denying, also, that the concept of a restudy is inherently more congenial to those who would like the social sciences to be more like the natural sciences: replicable, objective, and, above all, additive, converging on truth through objective argument and comparison of data. As I have said above, from this point of view, if it is going to be science, it has to be a restudy.
The pluralist position I have defined takes a broader perspective on the role of the restudy. By offering a new perspective on received wisdom, questioning authoritative accounts, and demonstrating the value of adding new perspectives and methodologies to areas and topics dominated by fundamentalism, a restudy can significantly broaden the middle ground. Anything that offers openings for new forms of collaboration, experimentation, multiplication of perspectives, and expansion of topical boundaries is an opportunity to build pluralism and to counter reductionism and extremism. The Journal of Consumer Research has made great strides in recent years in being more inclusive of new methodologies and approaches, but a true middle ground has been slow to emerge. Perhaps the space provided by the re-inquiry section will be the place where plural approaches to the same problems can all prove their value, rather than prove their superiority.
[David Glen Mick served as editor for this essay.] 
